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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last several years, state and federal officials have become
increasingly concerned about the security of state sovereignty in the
face of the United States government's aggressive trade policy.' As
barriers among countries diminish and the domestic and foreign
spheres of government become more integrated, a state's ability to
regulate and protect its interests and citizens appears to have become
secondary to the federal government's objective of promoting free
trade.2 This conflict between free trade and state sovereignty has
made it more difficult to define the role of individual American state
governments in international trade policy3 and has added to states'
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1. For example, the State of Texas brought together state government officials at a
conference in November, 1995, to discuss the impact of trade agreements on state and provincial
laws. See generally David Morel, Risk to Sub-national Laws From International Trade Agree-
ments, Address Before the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs Conference on The
Impacts of Trade Agreements on State/Provincial Law, (Nov. 10, 1995) (transcript available in
the Univ. of Texas at Austin Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs Library); see also Ben
Jones, Free Trade and State Sovereignty, 67 THE J. S. GOV'T 37 (1994); Professor Robert W.
Benson, Free Trade as Extremist Ideology, 17 S.U. L. REV. 555, 572 (1994).
2. See generally Morel, supra note 1; see also Mark Wolski, State Legislators told to prepare
for defense of their Environmental Laws, BNA STATE ENVIRONMENT DAILY, July 24, 1995;
Bickerstaff Heath & Smiley, L.L.P., International Trade Agreements May Affect Environmental
Laws in 4 TEXAS ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE UPDATE 6-8 (1994).
3. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1441, 1442 (1994).
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fears that the federal government will impermissibly compromise their
interests.
The rapid rate of globalization' is cited as one factor which
aggravates this conflict.6  International trade agreements 7 are an
impetus for globalization and add to state sovereignty concerns because
the agreements limit a state's ability to autonomously conduct trade
and regulate its interests.8 On the other hand, the federal government
is obligated under trade agreements to institute uniform standards to
facilitate the freer movement of goods, services, and people.9 Thus,
there is a growing imbalance within our current federalist system of
government because the federal government's obligation to establish
uniform standards under free trade agreements conflicts with state
governments' interests in protecting citizens and industries.
NAFTA has brought the state sovereignty issue to the political
forefront because it illustrates this conflict between the promotion of
free trade and the preservation of state autonomy.10 Under NAFTA,
states are to be informed of and included in trade negotiations that
4. See supra note 2; cf. Samuel C. Straight, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute
Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216, 221 (1995) (aserting that the
dispute resolution mechanism under the international trade agreement coupled with the federal
government's commitment to enforce NAFTA obligations creates fears of lost state sovereignty).
For more historical background on states' concerns regarding state sovereignty, see generally THE
FEDERALIST NOS. 37-63, at 224-390 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stressing a
formal division of powers between the national and state governments that favor state sovereignty
and limits the extent of enumerated national powers).
5. Globalization is the "process of denationalization of markets, laws and politics in the
sense of interlacing peoples and individuals for the sake of the common good." Jost Delbruck,
Globalization of Law, Politics and Markets: Implications for Domestic Law: A European
Perspective, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 11 (1993) (emphasis in original).
6. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1443; see also David P. Fidler, Caught Between Traditions:
The Security Council in Philosophic Conundrum, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 411, 444 (1996)
("Globalization shares with the liberal faith in economic interdependence the goal of eroding state
sovereignty to build connections and interests between people of the world." (emphasis added)).
7. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; see also The North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dec. 17,1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 296-456 & 605-800 [hereinafter NAFTA].
8. See supra notes 1-2.
9. For example, both the new GATT Uruguay Round Agreements and NAFTA require
the federal government to enforce U.S. international trade agreement obligations on state
governments in areas such as services, investment, energy, procurement, and standards. See
generally Morel, supra note 1.
10. See Wolski, supra note 2; see also Bickerstaff Heath & Smiley, supra note 2; Jones, supra
note 1; North American Free Trade Agreement and Implementing Legislation: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1993)
[NAFTA Implementing Legislation Hearings].
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directly affect their interests.1 However, while the U.S. government
may not want to imperil its relationship with state governments, its
primary objective remains to negotiate a politically satisfying settlement
that will not ultimately hinder the progress of free trade. Therefore,
what remains to be seen is whether states are indeed allowed to play a
role in international trade negotiations that affect their interests. To
appreciate the American states' predicament under NAFTA, this
Comment will examine a hypothetical dispute to illustrate the conflict
between free trade and state autonomy. This hypothetical dispute
introduces the situation that would arise if Mexico, a NAFTA
member, imposed a heightened agricultural import requirement for
health and safety reasons under NAFTA Sanitary and Phytosanitary
(S&P) Measures. 2
Suppose that Mexico introduces a new requirement that U.S. sweet
cherries be fumigated to eliminate agricultural pests, severely
affecting three American states. However, the U.S. believes that the
fumigation requirement is unnecessary because Mexico does not
have a developed sweet cherry industry that requires such a
protective measure, and an inspection and certification procedure,
similar to the one already in place, would be sufficient to eliminate
the risk of pests. Moreover, the U.S. also has reason to believe that
Mexico has instituted the requirement to pressure the U.S. into
lowering its standards for the import of certain Mexican agricultural
products.
Under NAFTA guidelines, the affected states should be informed
and included in negotiations because the new requirements could pose
serious economic consequences for the states, 13 but the states' interests
may hinder the U.S. government's ability to solve the issue in a
politically expedient way. What happens then if the U.S. government
does not uphold its obligations to states under NAFTA? Is there a
negative impact on state sovereignty? If so, do states have a constitu-
tional right, as well as a method, to safeguard against such an intrusion
on their sovereignty?
Both state and federal leaders will need to work together to
preserve state sovereignty in the face of challenges posed by trade
agreements. The U.S. government has no constitutional obligation to
11. NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at
19 U.S.C.A. § 3301), § 102(b)(1) [hereinafter Implementation Act].
12. NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 712; see also infra notes 126-140 and accompanying text for
a discussion of NAFTA S&P measures.
13. For example, the cost in new chemicals and equipment for the cherry industry may be
very high. The industry would also need the problem resolved by the next growing season.
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consult with individual states when negotiating trade agreements.14
It does, however, have an obligation under NAFTA to "consult with
the States for the purpose of achieving conformity of State laws and
practices with the Agreement.""5 Greater federal-state communication
will balance the struggle between the federal government's goal in
promoting free trade and individual state governments' interests in
protecting their sovereignty.
Part II of this Comment examines the federalist principles that
influence the existing federal-state framework of authority. Part II also
discusses the federal government's constitutional authority over state
compliance with U.S. trade obligations and whether states have any
constitutional or legal authority to demand more autonomy in
conducting their trade and commerce.
Part III introduces NAFTA and discusses the U.S. government's
obligation to individual states under NAFTA to consult with states in
trade matters that will affect state interests. Part IV then examines
how the NAFTA federal-state consultation process can serve as a
safeguard against the federal government's infringement on state
sovereignty.
This Comment concludes that NAFTA, by requiring increased
communication between federal and state government leaders, can have
a positive impact on state sovereignty. Because the federal government
is obligated under the NAFTA federal-state consultation process to
include states in on-going NAFTA trade policy decisions and
negotiations, 16 a balance between free trade and state sovereignty is
attainable. Using the NAFTA consultation framework as a model, the
federal government and the states now have the opportunity to
promote free trade and preserve state sovereignty.
II. AMERICAN FEDERALISM AND THE PRICE FOR FREE TRADE
The principle that individual states' power be properly balanced
against the federal government's power in order to protect the rights
of American citizens dates back to our country's foundation. 7
Although our federal system of government is structured such that a
healthy balance between state and national governments is struck, the
pendulum of economic, political and social change often swings far and
throws off balance the equilibrium established between the two powers.
14. See Part II.B.l.a-b for a discussion of the constitutional aspects.
15. Implementation Act, supra note 11, § 102(bXl).
16. Implementation Act, supra note 11, § 102(b)(1).
17. See infra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
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Thus, when international trade policy conflicts with a state's traditional
role of regulating and protecting its interests, the balance in our federal
system of government is upset. This Comment next explores the U.S.
government's foundation in federalism and how that foundation
requires that a balance be maintained between federal and state
government.
A. The Origins of American Federalism
The United States has a federalist system of government under its
Constitution."1 This system, whereby the national government and
the government of each of the fifty states coexist, developed out of the
tumultuous relationship that existed between the original thirteen states
and the national government under the Articles of Confederation.' 9
Under the Articles, the national government was paralyzed because it
had no means with which to exercise power over the people directly,
had no authority to make and enforce binding law, and had to rely on
the states' voluntary cooperation.2"
The effect of this disunity upon the nation's economy and its role
in world politics was the main concern of the politicians who gathered
at Philadelphia in 1787 for the drafting of the Constitution.2  The
Antifederalists advocated against ratification of the Constitution
because it took too much power from the state governments.22 They
saw the states, rather than a central government, as the best guardians
of the citizens.23 On the other hand, the framers of the Constitution
saw a central government representing one unified view as being more
effective in pursuing national interests.24 Consequently, an important
debate evolved around the role and function of the two systems of
government.25
18. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988).
19. Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, in
AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, 85-98
(Lawrence Friedman and Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1978).
20. Id.; see also Paul J. Scudiere, In Order to Form a More Perfect Union, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN IN THE
FRAMiNG AND ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 3, 5 (Patrick T. Conley et al. eds.,
1988) (quoting Alexander Hamilton's lament that a less centralized, natural government would
allow for: "[A]n uncontrollable sovereignty in each state (that] will make our nation feeble and
precarious.").
21. See Scudiere, supra note 20, at 5; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 106-108
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
22. Scheiber, supra note 19, at 87.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.; see generally 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
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The compromise reached by the convention was to adopt a
"federal" system of government in which the maintenance of the states
and their governments would be as important to the preservation of the
Constitution and the Union as the safekeeping of the national
government. 26  To ensure the institution of a strong central govern-
ment that was properly balanced against independent state govern-
ments, the framers drafted a Constitution that "established a more
perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with
ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the Confederate
government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the
States. "27  The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate
individuals, not states,28 by founding the federal system of govern-
ment on two principal premises:
[t]he first was structural: it involved "engrafting" the system of
national government onto the existing system of states by giving the
states as such a direct representation in Congress and by leaving
with the states major powers in controlling the process of elections.
The second feature was operational: it involved a formal division
of powers between the states and the national government, with
government at both levels operating on individual citizens in pursuit
of the common interest.29
Individual citizens are the essential components of government and
"[t]he government of the Union, like that of each State, must be able
to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals."3 °
Thus, by instituting formal, properly balanced divisions between state
and national government authority, the framers were able to "reduce
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front"'" and ensure that
individual citizens would be influential members of the federal system
of government. Because this balance between the states and the federal
26. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869) ("[tlhe Constitution, in all its
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States."); Metcalf & Eddy
v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926) ("neither government may destroy the other nor curtail in
any substantial manner the exercise of its powers"); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458, (1990)
("under our federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal
Government"); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) ("the States retain substantial
sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily
interfere").
27. Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869).
28. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992); see also THE FEDERALIST NO.
15, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("We must extend the authority of
the Union to the persons of the citizens-the only proper objects of government.").
29. Scheiber, supra note 19, at 88.
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 16, at 116 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
31. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
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government is crucial to the protection of individual citizens, any shift
in economic, political or social conditions that disrupts the established
equilibrium requires an adjustment to restore the balance."
At that point, "the constitutional line between federal and state
power ... [that is,]... whether particular sovereign powers have been
granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government or have been
retained by the States" 33 needs to be evaluated once again. For
example, the concern over the proper division of authority between the
federal government and state governments has recently gained national
attention due to a growing imbalance within our current federalist
system.34 This imbalance results from the struggle between the U.S.
federal government's goal of promoting free trade and the individual
state governments' interests in protecting their citizens, industries, and
economies.
B. The Growing Imbalance of American Federalism
The integration of domestic and foreign markets through
international trade agreements has led to difficulty in defining the
proper role of individual American state governments in international
trade policy.3" Trade agreements have an increasing impact upon
state governments primarily for three reasons. First, state economies
have gradually become more reliant on international commerce as states
have become more heavily involved in the international marketplace.36
Second, there is an increased emphasis on binding state governments
to obligations within international trade agreements.3" Third, the
scope of trade agreements is being enlarged to encompass areas where
normally only state governments exercised jurisdiction.3"
Although federal trade negotiators cannot ignore state sovereignty,
the U.S. federal government is the primary actor in international trade
32. See Laurence J. Aurbach, Federalism in the Global Millennium, 26 URB. LAW 235
(1994).
33. New York, 505 U.S. at 155.
34. See supra notes 1-2.
35. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1442.
36. Friedman, supra note 3, at 1441; see also Aurbach, supra note 32, at 235; Richard B.
Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821, 821-822 (1989).
37. Matthew Schaefer, Note on State Involvement in Free Trade Negotiations, the Development
of Trade Agreement Implementing Legislation, and the Administration of Trade Agreements, in LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, § 3.6 (John H. Jackson et al. eds.,
1995) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS].
38. Id.; see also infra notes 118-136 and accompanying text for examples of how NAFTA
encroaches upon areas, such as environmental and sanitary and phytosanitary, and health and
safety regulations, in which only state governments previously exercised jurisdiction.
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policy and has the authority to negotiate binding trade agreements that
limit a state's sovereign ability to make and institute regulatory policy
choices. 39  Aside from congressional representation, state input in
trade negotiations is limited to advice. The fact that states have no
veto power or binding advisory capacity adds to the sense of helpless-
ness felt by states as the federal government obligates states to
international trade agreements upon which state leaders can only offer
advice. Therefore, as states find themselves becoming more active
participants in the global marketplace, state governments are watching
their ability to regulate and protect their interests come into conflict
with the federal government's objective of promoting free trade.40
1. Is State Sovereignty Really the Price of Free Trade?
Is the federal government infringing on state sovereignty by
promoting free trade? Is the federal government restricting or
prohibiting state actions that affect international trade? If it is, are
there any constitutional limitations on its ability to do so? Not all
government officials agree that trade agreements significantly alter the
existing federal balance between state and national government.4
Some officials argue that fears of diminished state sovereignty are
unwarranted because states have been operating under trade obligations
for almost fifty years (since the institution of GATT in 1947).42
These obligations have not changed to a great extent with the passage
39. See Jones, supra note 1. In explaining how binding international trade agreements
infringe upon, or place constraints on, a state's ability to regulate and protect its interests, the
author notes:
International trade commitments under NAFTA and GATT are expected to produce
challenges to longstanding state regulations and legislation in many areas. Foreign
competitors can claim that a state regulation or statute constitutes a trade barrier because
it offers a competitive advantage or a de facto subsidy to U.S. businesses. This type of
complaint, typified by the U.S.-Canada "Beer Wars," is expected to be more frequent
under the broader NAFTA than under the more carefully defined GATT agreement.
Other areas open to dispute include banking and insurance, the trucking industry,
environmental regulations, government procurement, occupational licensing and export
promotion programs.
Id. at 1.
40. See NAFTA Implementing Legislation Hearings, supra note 10, at 36 (Senator Ted Stevens
explaining to Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, his concern about state sovereignty:
"We are a Federal Government of limited powers with reserved powers to the States. And I fear
and I am concerned about what NAFTA and the side agreements do to State powers. I think
that ... negotiated executive agreements between... very strong federal governments. ... are
negating a lot of States' rights.").
41. Telephone Interview with Clayton Parker, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 9, 1996).
42. Id.
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of the WTO43 or NAFTA and states have the same rights under
more recent trade agreements, such as NAFTA, as under previous
trade agreements. Furthermore, trade agreement obligations are
essentially just another form of government regulation of commerce
under this nation's Commerce Clause and states have always been
subject to Commerce Clause requirements.45
On the other hand, there is concern among state government
officials that free trade is being advanced at the expense of state
sovereignty because international trade agreements place constraints on
those state actions that affect international trade.46 In addition, states
have no constitutional protection on which to rely if their ability to
make and enforce state laws is constrained by trade agreements.47
This lack of protection, in addition to the effects of globalization and
trade agreements like NAFTA, has placed state sovereignty in a
precarious position. The next section addresses the federal govern-
ment's authority to restrict or prohibit international trade activity and
how those restrictions affect state sovereignty.
a. Constitutional Enforcement of Trade Agreements
While it is clear that the federal government has always had the
authority to impose on the states both domestic and international
regulations, the federal government had not used this authority to bind
the states to an international trade agreement that compromised a
state's ability to independently regulate and protect its own individual
interests until the signing of NAFTA. NAFTA signifies a change in
this policy because the trade agreement mandates uniform regulations,
thereby requiring states to regulate according to NAFTA guidelines in
areas that were previously left to independent state regulation.48 In
43. 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994).
44. Interview with Clayton Parker, supra note 41. For example, under NAFTA articles 904
and 712, each state has the ability to set its own regulatory standards under the following
conditions: the standards must be consistent with requirements set out by agreements, such as
those based on science; the standards must not be applied in a discriminatory manner; and, the
standards must not impose undue restrictions on the free flow of trade. See also Shaefer, supra
note 37, at 182 (NAFTA "grandfathers" in certain existing state measures that could otherwise
violate NAFTA requirements, such as those in the services, financial services, and investment
chapters, if the measures are identified within a year or two.).
45. Interview with Clayton Parker, supra note 41.
46. Telephone Interview with Professor Robert Stumberg, Georgetown University Law
Center, Harrison Institute for Public Law (Jan. 9, 1996). His research has affirmed the states'
concerns that the impairment of their autonomy under trade agreements will ultimately lead to
economic problems, such as job loss.
47. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 38.
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addition, globalization has required states to become international
economic actors. Therefore, increased regulation, on an international
scale, will have greater effect on state regulatory authority than it
would have in the past.
While states have traditionally had no constitutional basis to
protect their sovereignty in the face of federal regulation, the larger
obstacle for states in terms of protecting their sovereignty is authority
the federal government possesses to bind the American states to trade
agreement obligations without their consent.49 Moreover, if state
actions are viewed as negatively affecting U.S. trade obligations, they
are subject to challenge by the federal government on three grounds:
federal statutory preemption; unconstitutional restrictions on com-
merce; and unconstitutional interference under the Supremacy
Clause. 0 Thus, although the federal government has not used its
constitutional authority to overrule inconsistent state laws in the nearly
half-century history of GATT or the five years that CUSFTA1 has
been in effect, the federal government clearly has the authority to
restrict or prohibit state international trade activity.52
b. Authority to Bind the States
United States trade agreements are generally negotiated as either
treaties 3 or executive agreements.54 Although both are considered
treaties and equally binding in international law, the distinction
between treaties and executive agreements is unclear in U.S. constitu-
tional law. 5 What is clear, however, is that an executive agreement
implemented into law by Congressional enactment or executive branch
49. It is argued by some critics that states need not be consulted during trade negotiations
and have given their consent to the federal government because their interests are represented in
Congress; see generally INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 37, §§ 3.2-3.3.
50. See Howard N. Fenton, III, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and
Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 563, 571 (1993).
51. Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 IL.M. 281, 293.
52. Interview with Clayton Parker, supra note 41.
53. See INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 37, § 3.3. Treaties are
constitutionally required to be ratified by a two-thirds Congressional vote, but the Constitution
makes no mention of executive agreements.
54. Id. With an executive agreement, the President accepts an agreement as a binding
obligation of the U.S. without any congressional participation and the agreement is either self-
executing, i.e., it directly gives rights to individual citizens by its own terms, or non-self-
executing, i.e., requires the national government to effectuate the rights imposed by the
international obligation.
55. Edmond McGovern, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATT, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, § 2.232 (2nd ed. 1986); see also INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 37, § 3.3.
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regulation pursuant to preexisting statutory authority has the same
force in domestic U.S. law as a treaty.5 6 Indeed, executive agreements
are the principal means by which the U.S. enters into obligations under
international trade agreements.5 7 Therefore, because they have treaty
status in U.S. law, trade agreements not only bind the states and
require state governments to uphold these obligations,58 but they also
prevail over inconsistent state law.59
The federal government not only has the authority to bind the
states to trade agreement obligations, but it also has certain constitu-
tional mechanisms to ensure that the states uphold U.S. trade
obligations. These mechanisms include statutory preemption, the
Commerce Clause, and the Supremacy Clause.
i. Statutory Preemption
When the federal government enacts a statute or signs a treaty
that might later conflict with state law, whether the federal law
preempts existing state laws or state action in that area depends upon
the federal government's intent.60 The federal government's intent to
preempt is evident when it has consistently undertaken regulatory or
rule making activity in a particular area, or has acted in a manner that
indicates an attempt to occupy the field.6 If the federal government
has acted with the intent to exclude state action, then the state law will
be preempted unless it can be characterized as an exercise of spending
or police powers. 62 However, because "NAFTA does not automati-
cally 'preempt' or invalidate State laws that do not conform to
56. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 37, § 3.3.
57. McGovern, supra note 55, § 2.232.
58. See generally INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 37, at § 3.3-3.4; see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115
cmt. e (1987) ("Since any treaty or other international agreement of the United States, ... is
federal law ..., it supersedes inconsistent State law or policy whether adopted earlier or later.").
59. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1936) (holding that "the external powers
of the United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies.").
60. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 37, § 3.6; Fenton, supra note 50,
at 572 (the test for determining whether the state law is preempted is whether the federal
government intended to preempt state action through legislative or executive trade control
regimes).
61. Fenton, supra note 50, at 572.
62. Id.
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NAFTA's rules,"63 this Comment will not discuss the issue of the
federal government preempting state action under NAFTA.
ii. Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commerce
It is fairly well established in today's constitutional jurisprudence
that the federal government holds preeminent authority, if it chooses
to exercise it, over states in almost all issues that have commercial
overtones, such as international trade policy and agreements.' Even
when the federal government has not preempted a particular area by
statute or treaty, when state action in that area places an impermissible
burden upon international trade, it interferes with commerce in
violation of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.65 However,
state regulation of commercial activity is usually free from the federal
government's scrutiny when the state is acting as a market partici-
pant6 instead of as a market regulator.67 As a market participant
the state's action does not impose an excessive burden upon interstate
commerce.68
When a state regulation is claimed to impermissibly burden
commerce, the state will often raise the Tenth Amendment in defense
of its action. The Tenth Amendment was initially held to bar the
63. The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act Statement of
Administrative Action, in NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT TREATY MATERIALS,
Booklet No. 8 1-15, at 8 (James R. Holbein et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter Statement of Adminis-
trative Action].
64. INTERNATIONAL EcONoMIc RELATIONS, supra note 37, § 3.6.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
66. A state acts as a market participant when it spends money to run a proprietary
enterprise or to subsidize private businesses. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughs v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
67. A state acts as a market regulator when it enacts regulations that impose commercial
barriers or discriminates against an out-of-state article of commerce in favor of local interests. See
C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978).
68. See South Central Timber Development Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (holding
that the dormant commerce clause does not prohibit a state-acting as a market participant,
instead of as a market regulator-from imposing burdens upon commerce within the market of
which it is a participant); Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3rd Circ.
1990) (determining that the Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act, which directed
Pennsylvania state agencies to require use of only U.S.-made steel in public works projects, did
not violate the Commerce Clause because Pennsylvania is a market participant in the steel
market), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
69. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
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federal government from actions that impaired a state's ability to
perform its traditional functions.7" Over the past twenty years,
however, the Supreme Court has inconsistently applied Tenth
Amendment protection to state and local governments in Commerce
Clause cases.7 This inconsistency has engendered a certain amount
of legal uncertainty with respect to how much leeway states have when
regulating in areas affecting commerce.
The current majority has, however, hinted at a change in the
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence by placing greater importance
on the federalist principles that the Constitution was founded on and
on the Tenth Amendment.7 1 In a 5-4 vote, the majority in U.S. v.
Lopez invalidated a federal statute enacted for the purposes of
regulating commerce on the grounds that it was beyond Congress'
Commerce power.73 However, unless Lopez signals a change in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, except for the instances when a state's
regulation of commercial activity is considered permissible under the
market participant doctrine, states can be sure that any regulation of
commercial activity that affects domestic or international commerce
will be scrutinized for any burdens the regulation might impose upon
the free flow of commerce.
iii. Unconstitutional Interference Under the Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause establishes that the Constitution and the
federal laws and treaties that flow from it are superior to state law.74
Consequently, when state and federal laws conflict, the Constitution
requires that the incompatible state law be invalidated. 75  For exam-
ple, even if a federal statute implementing a trade agreement is
70. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976); Fry v. United States,
421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975).
71. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833 (5-4 decision) (holding that the structure of the
federal system and the Tenth Amendment placed some limits on the federal government's power
to regulate state and local government commercial activities); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (5-4 decision) (overruling National League of Cities, the Court
declined to define the breadth of Congress' Commerce Clause powers under the federal system;
however, it did conclude that the Constitution did not expressly guarantee state sovereignty to the
extent that it may not be displaced by a proper exercise of Congressional delegated powers); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (declining to reconsider the holding in Garcia for stare
decisis purposes, the Court concluded that under the Commerce Clause, the federal government
could not compel or order states to regulate private commercial activity because the Constitution
leaves to states an inviolable sovereignty through the Tenth Amendment).
72. See U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
73. Id.
74. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
75. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 37, § 3.3.
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considered an unconstitutional interference with state power, the
federal law prevails.76 Further, federal law will prevail over incompat-
ible state law when a statute implements a trade agreement because
more reason exists to conclude that Congress, when it implements a
trade agreement into domestic law, intends to carry out the obligations
under the trade agreement.77
Whether federal law prevails under the Supremacy clause becomes
a more complex issue when a third party is involved, such as a foreign
subnational government whose interest may be affected by the
incompatible American state law.7" Although there are strong
federalist concerns that states should have the authority to regulate and
protect their citizens and economies, the Supremacy Clause reinforces
the equally strong sentiment that the U.S. should have only one voice,
that of the federal government, articulating its international trade
policy.79
2. The Political Process as Protector of State Sovereignty
Some state leaders contend that the current federalist balance does
not adequately protect states from federal government interference with
a state's ability to freely participate in international trade activities.80
As a result of the limited weight the Supreme Court has given the
Tenth Amendment, states have effectively no constitutional protection
when faced with the federal government's exercise of authority under
the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses in enforcement of trade
agreement obligations at state government levels.
On the other hand, there are politicians, as well as Supreme Court
justices,"1 who are confident that the political process ensures that the
States will not be confronted with laws which unduly burden their
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Julie Long, Note, Ratcheting up Federalism: A Supremacy Clause Analysis of NAFTA
and the Uruguay Round Agreement, 80 MINN. L. REV. 231, 246 (1995).
79. See Fenton, supra note 50, at 573. See generally United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1941); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1940); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1967); Japan
Line Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of
Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986).
80. See Morel, supra note 1. But cf. Dan Morales, The Evolving Protection of State Laws
and the Environment: NAFTA from a Texas Perspective, 5 U.S.-Mex. Occas. Paper 1-54 (1994).
The author suggests that the implementing legislation and the Statement of Administrative Action
work together to ensure that states will have the opportunity to protect their rights. The end
result is that NAFTA, as implemented by Congress, provides for more protection of state law
than any previous trade agreement in U.S. history.
81. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
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abilities.8 2 According to these voices, the structure of the federal
government has been constitutionally arranged for the purpose of
protecting state sovereignty: 3 each state has two Senators represent-
ing its interests in Congress, states are given general control over
electoral qualifications for federal elections, and states have a special
role in presidential elections by means of the electoral college. 4  In
addition, political pressure from state constituents is protection against
congressional interference with state sovereignty." For example, the
Constitution's Commerce and Supremacy Clauses grant the federal
government the legal authority to enforce NAFTA provisions within
state jurisdictions, but federal government officials might be unwilling
to confront state governmental leaders if it means that the federal
officials might injure their political image, either with the state officials,
or with constituents.8 6  However, it is debatable whether the proce-
dural structure of the federalist system truly acts as a check against
Congress' ability to infringe on state sovereignty. A number of recent
changes in how Congress works 7 have probably diminished the
weight Congress gives to the legitimate interests of states.88
Still, state autonomy is an essential ingredient of federalism. 9
If Congress does not regulate matters affecting commerce in a way that
balances state autonomy against the interests of an integrated national
economy, our government will be unable to "reconcile the Constitu-
tion's dual concerns for federalism and an effective commerce
power."9  The need for an integrated national economy coincides
with the federal government's interest in speaking with one voice in the
82. Id.
83. Id. ("[T]he principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in
all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system provides through state
participation in federal government action.").
84. Id. at 564.
85. But see New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 169 (Justice O'Connor stating that
"[aiccountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot
regulate in accordance with the views of the local electorate in matters not preempted by federal
regulation.").
86. See Dr. Earl H. Fry, Sovereignty and Federalism: U.S. and Canadian Perspectives
Challenges to Sovereignty and Governance, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 303, 311 (1994).
87. Such as the direct election of Senators, as well as the expanded interest of national
interest groups, whose influence in Congress appears to be greater than that of the states.
88. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 587-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The political process has
not protected against these encroachments [Congress' infringement on state sovereignty through
federal legislation] on state activities, even though they directly impinge on a State's ability to
make and enforce its laws.").
89. Id. at 588.
90. Id. at 581.
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international arena.91 For example, if the federal government does not
ensure that U.S. obligations under a trade agreement are upheld by
states, states may impose burdens upon international trade that conflict
with national trade policy goals and damage the free flow of trade.92
The Supreme Court has concluded on numerous occasions that
allowing variant state policies to qualify federal trade policies would be
a dangerous practice.93
Therefore, unless a state regulation that burdens free trade has a
legitimate police power purpose, or the state is a market participant,
the state regulation is prohibited by the federal government under its
Commerce and Supremacy Clause authority.94  The federal govern-
ment must be able to demonstrate that it can achieve state conformity
with U.S. trade obligations and goals in a global economy. If the
ability of our nation to speak with one voice is impaired, the U.S. will
not likely retain its position as an effective world leader in advocating
free trade.
III. NAFTA FEDERAL-STATE CONSULTATION PROCESS
Because today's political process may no longer provide a state
with a feasible and effective way to address its grievances regarding
trade policy, each state is placed in a precarious position. Wholesale
invalidation of state law potentially in conflict with federal trade goals
is neither politically feasible nor good policy. If the States are
consistently prohibited from regulating trade in a way that protects
their interests, the balance that American federalism is founded on will
never be regained.95 NAFTA's implementation of a cooperative
mechanism for state participation in federal decisions concerning
international trade activities should alleviate the fears that NAFTA
violates state sovereignty and restore that balance.
91. See supra note 80.
92. Id.
93. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. at 232 ("If state action could defeat or alter our foreign
policy, serious consequences might ensue. The nation as a whole would be held to answer if a
State created difficulties with a foreign power."); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 63 ("Our
system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the
interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field
affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference."); Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. at 440 ("[State] regulations must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's
foreign policy.").
94. See Fenton, supra note 50, at 572.
95. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 581 ("The true 'essence' of federalism is that the States as States
have legitimate interests which the National Government is bound to respect even though its laws
are supreme.").
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A. NAFTA
On November 17, 1993, three years after the initiative was
launched by former President Bush, the United States House of
Representatives voted 234 to 200 to approve NAFTA.9 6 Three days
later, the United States Senate also gave its approval,97 and on
December 8th, President Clinton signed the bill authorizing the
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement.98
NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994.99
NAFTA is the most comprehensive international trade agreement
ever negotiated.100 It provides a solid framework for the liberaliza-
tion of trade barriers throughout the Western Hemisphere and serves
as a catalyst for negotiations to liberalize trade barriers on a multilateral
basis. 1°1 Within fifteen years, NAFTA will create the world's largest
integrated market for goods and services by gradually eliminating all
trade tariffs between the world's largest, eighth largest and fifteenth
largest national economies. 02
However, in promoting the free movement of workers, products,
and services between Canada, Mexico, and the United States, NAFTA
requires greater uniformity and regulatory coordination than prior trade
agreements. 03 In order to successfully integrate NAFTA member
economies, trade liberalization and commercial expansion must be
carried out in a nondiscriminatory manner. °4 Thus, the U.S. federal
96. 139 CONG. REC. H10,048 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993).
97. 139 CONG. REC. S16,712-713 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993).
98. Id.
99. Fry, supra note 86, at 304.
100. H.R. REP. No. 361,103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993), reprinted in 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2552,
2558 (1993).
101. Id. All tariffs with regards to U.S. bilateral trade with Canada will be eliminated by
1999. Most tariffs in U.S. bilateral trade with Mexico will be eliminated by 2004. Id.; see also
Fry, supra note 86, at 304-306.
102. 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2558. Canada and Mexico are the United States' first and third
largest trading partners. With NAFTA, the three trading partners. Id. With NAFTA, the three
trading partners will create a combined economy of $6.5 trillion and 370 million people. Id. at
2731.
103. NAFTA would fail if it were possible for individual states to maintain separate
regulations different than those in the NAFTA because it would be extremely difficult for
member countries to have knowledge of and to comply with varying regulations. If such
knowledge was required, NAFTA trade benefits would be essentially nullified because NAFTA
members would find the varying regulations a deterrent to using the agreement.
104. See Raymond B. Ludwiszewski and Peter E. Seley, 'Green' Language in the NAFTA:
Reconciling Free Trade and Environmental Protection, in THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE
AMERICAS, 375-395 (Judith H. Bello et al. eds., 1994).
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government mandated that state laws and regulations conform to the
standards set out within the NAFTA framework, thereby binding the
State governments." 5
Historically, the federal government rarely considered state
regulations when negotiating international trade agreements,0 6 yet it
typically did protect state authority over regulatory concerns within a
state's borders. 10 7  NAFTA, however, requires the federal govern-
ment to ensure that states' health, safety, and environmental standards
conform to the basic trade principles of national treatment and
nondiscrimination.' 8 Because this uniformity of regulation signifi-
cantly narrows the state regulatory sphere, NAFTA severely limits
state sovereignty.
Furthermore, if NAFTA members do not enforce these obliga-
tions on their subnational entities, conflicting state laws can be
challenged by another NAFTA member.'0 9 That member can then
seek permission to retaliate or simply take unilateral actions to gain
compliance."0 Because NAFTA countries can now challenge state
laws that in the past were only constrained by the U.S. or state
constitutions as trade barriers, states must be ready to defend such
challenges."' Now more than ever, American states should be
particularly concerned with defending trade agreement challenges
because sanctions for noncompliance with the agreement now entail
punitive tariffs, posing a costly risk to states and their industries."'
To gain a better understanding of why a state's leaders might view
NAFTA as infringing upon their state sovereignty, this Comment now
returns to the hypothetical scenario set out in the introduction.
Suppose the American states affected by the new fumigation require-
ment decide not to comply with Mexico's new standard. Mexico is
entitled to impose a standard more stringent than the international
standards which bind NAFTA members in order to protect its citizens,
105. When Congress approved NAFTA, it bound both the federal government and the
states to its terms; see Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 63; Implementation Act,
supra note 11. NAFTA subjects state laws and regulations to basic trade principles of national
treatment and nondiscrimination. NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 301, 712.
106. Doug Farquhar, NAFTA and Its Effect on State Environmental Policies, in STATE
LEGISLATURE REPORT (National Conference of State Legislatures, Denver, CO), July 1995 at
1.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2.
109. See NAFTA, supra note 7, clhp. 7; cf. chp. 9.
110. Morel, supra note 1, at 5.
111. Farquhar, supra note 106, at 7.
112. See NAFTA, supra note 7, ch. 19.
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as long as the standard is imposed in a nondiscriminatory manner." 3
After negotiations with Mexican trade officials, the U.S. government
may agree with Mexico's new standard and may decide to enforce it
against the states.1 4
The only method of protection that the states could feasibly
employ, for their cherry industries and for themselves, is the political
process.' The states cannot bring a claim against the U.S. govern-
ment, 1 6 nor can they protest the Mexican standard, unless the U.S.
government agrees to bring the grievance before a NAFTA panel." 7
Thus, without any protection, the states and their industries face
potentially debilitating economic consequences. As this hypothetical
example indicates, the integration of individual state regulations into
NAFTA standards is one example of how the federal government's
trade policy has encroached upon states' authority, which was
previously unaffected by international trade obligations." 8
NAFTA standards rules affect individual states by inviting
scrutiny of state regulations that may restrict international trade." 9
This scrutiny is of particular concern to states because it affects
authority to regulate in such areas as the environment, natural
resources, and consumer safety. 20 Examination of NAFTA Sanitary
and Phytosanitary (S&P) measures, one set of standards rules contained
within NAFTA, reveals some of the risks encountered by states when
regulating in the face of existing trade agreement obligations.' 2 '
Although NAFTA members may "adopt, maintain or apply any
sanitary or phytosanitary measure necessary for the protection of
human, animal or plant life or health in its territory, '"22 state stan-
dards are compromised by the standards harmonization process of
NAFTA.'123 The NAFTA standards harmonization process carries
serious implications for states trying to adopt, maintain or apply S&P
measures. First, a NAFTA member can impose a higher S&P
113. NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 712.
114. Implementation Act, supra note 11, § 102(b)(2).
115. See supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
116. Id., § 102(c).
117. Id.
118. Paul M. Orbuch and Thomas 0. Singer, Ph.D., International Trade, the Environment,
and the States: An Evolving State-Federal Relationship 1-22, 1 (1995) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
119. Id. at 3.
120. Id.
121. NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 712.
122. Id.
123. Orbuch and Singer, supra note 118, at 1.
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standard than the international standard,124 as long as the higher
standard is necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant
life, 2 ' is based on scientific principles,126 and does not "unjustifi-
ably discriminate between [that member's] goods and like goods of
another Party."' 27  Second, the NAFTA member objecting to the
higher standard bears the burden of demonstrating that the higher
standard has no scientific validity.2 '
There is, however, one distinct advantage associated with a
NAFTA member's ability to impose a higher standard. States can
provide additional protection for their citizens and interests because
NAFTA does not prohibit a state from maintaining standards higher
than those of the agreement. 2 9 NAFTA only requires states to
comply with the above mentioned rules when determining the level of
standard imposed. 3 On the other hand, there are several disadvan-
tages involved with the ability to impose a higher standard. First, a
higher standard could easily be used to cloak a NAFTA member's
efforts to restrict a particular import from another NAFTA member.
Second, the legitimate use of a higher standard may trigger a challenge
if it is viewed as a discriminatory trade barrier subject to challenge.
Thus, an American state's standards that are more restrictive than
those maintained by a NAFTA trading partner are subject to
international trade challenges if they prevent the sale of noncomplying
goods.'31
Turning back to the scenario set out in the introduction, to rebut
Mexico's claims that the regulation is necessary for health and safety
purposes, the American states could certainly argue that Mexico's
heightened S&P measure "creates a disguised restriction on trade
between the Parties. 1 32  However, the affected states would then
have the difficult burden of proving that the heightened standard is not
based on scientific principles and constitutes an obstacle to free
trade.133 Consequently, it is difficult for a state to regulate in a way
that protects its interests. Further, the ability to impose higher
standards potentially could be utilized by other NAFTA members as
124. NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 713.
125. Id. at art. 712.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at art. 713.
130. Id.
131. Id. at art. 712.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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an effective trade weapon to debilitate American industries. This
scenario under NAFTA S&P standards is one example of how federal
trade policy infringes upon state authority previously unaffected by
international trade obligations134 and constrains a state's ability to
regulate its own interests.
Limitations on state sovereignty, such as the ones imposed under
NAFTA's S&P standards, are at the root of the growing imbalance
within our current federalist system. As trade arrangements like
NAFTA increase global economic integration, the struggle within our
federalist system between the interests of the state and federal
governments could increase and potentially cripple the federal system
upon which our nation's government is founded. The question then
becomes how will the balance be regained? Is there a mechanism in
place to safeguard against the growing imbalance? The NAFTA
federal-state consultation process is one such safeguard against the
growing imbalance. 3 ' The administrative consultation procedure set
out in the NAFTA legislation should help delineate the appropriate
division of authority between state and federal governments when
international trade policy intersects with traditional state roles in
protecting their interests.'36
B. Relationship of NAFTA to State Law
NAFTA is a nonself-executing congressional executive agreement
entered into by the President under the authority of the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.' NAFTA's provisions are
incorporated into United States domestic law through federal stat-
ute-the NAFTA Implementation Act. 3' The NAFTA implement-
ing legislation, approved by Congress when it passed NAFTA,
determines the legal relationship between NAFTA, federal law, and
individual state law.'39
The terms of NAFTA's implementing legislation are as important
as the terms of the agreement itself because NAFTA, as a trade
agreement, requires a separate law to be brought into effect. Indeed,
of particular importance to both federal and state leaders was the
federal-state consultation process contained within NAFTA's
134. Orbuch and Singer, supra note 118, at 1.
135. Implementation Act, supra note 11, § 102(b)(1)(B).
136. Id.
137. See Benson, supra note 1, at 572; see also discussion of executive agreements as
authority in U.S. law, supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
138. Benson, supra note 1, at 572.
139. Implementation Act, supra note 11, § 102(a) and (b).
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implementing legislation.14 ° The federal government, prompted by
states' concerns over potential legal threats raised by NAFTA, made
a commitment to state sovereignty through NAFTA's implementing
legislation. 141  Thus, NAFTA presents opportunities as well as
conflicts. Although there is clearly a conflict between the desire of
individual states to protect their interests and the federal government's
pressure upon states to conform with NAFTA standards, NAFTA is
the first U.S. trade agreement in which states have the "opportunity to
participate in the resolution of trade challenges that affect state
law.- 142
1. NAFTA Statement of Administrative Action
The NAFTA Statement of Administrative Action describes the
Administration's definitive interpretation of NAFTA and the actions
proposed to implement the agreement. 143 The Statement of Admin-
istrative Action is especially significant to the States because it contains
the federal government's declaration that it is "committed to carrying
out U.S. obligations under the NAFTA, as they apply to the States,
through the greatest possible degree of state-federal consultation and
cooperation. "144 In addition to assisting states in conforming their
laws and practices to NAFTA, the administration, through the United
States Trade Representative (USTR), has pledged to involve the States
to the greatest possible extent in the development of United States
positions on NAFTA issues by: providing for the reciprocal exchange
of information and advice between the States and the Executive Branch
regarding any matter under NAFTA that may have a direct effect on
state interests; seeking advice from the States and taking such advice
into account when formulating U.S. positions; and permitting state
representatives to assist in relevant federal agency preparations for such
work. 145
The federal government also recognizes that each state may need
advice and input regarding NAFTA trade-related matters that affect
its interests. In order to "take into account the views of state
governments in implementing the NAFTA with respect to any matter
that may directly affect their interests," '46 the USTR has designated
140. Implementation Act, supra note 11, § 102(b)(1)(B).
141. Implementation Act, supra note 11, § 102(b)(1).
142. Morales, supra note 80, at 1.
143. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 63, at 1.
144. Id. at 9.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 10.
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a "NAFTA Coordinator for State Matters."' 47  The NAFTA
Coordinator, serving as a liaison between the Executive Branch and the
States, has an obligation to relay advice and information to states on
NAFTA trade-related matters that affect a State's interests, such as,
"implementation of the NAFTA in any area... in which the States
exercise concurrent or exclusive legislative, regulatory or enforcement
authority; dispute settlement proceedings challenging state measures;
and, ... inquiries from other NAFTA countries concerning state
measures. '"148 This obligation reveals the federal government's
cognizance that state standards affected by NAFTA cannot be
modified without consultation with the affected states.
States also have a duty in this consultative procedure. Each state
must communicate with the federal government about NAFTA trade-
related matters that affect state interests. 49 The governor's office in
each state has the responsibility of designating their own NAFTA
coordinator to transmit information to the USTR and to disseminate
information received from the USTR to relevant state offices.' In
addition, the Statement of Administrative Action calls for the
governors to "jointly designate one or two Governors as principal
point(s) of contact with USTR on particular matters affecting state
interests."' 1  Thus, the Statement of Administrative Action specifi-
cally addresses "the importance of coordination and consultation with
state governments in areas of special importance or sensitivity to them,
including with regard to state laws protecting human, animal or plant
health or the environment.' 152
2. NAFTA Implementation Act
NAFTA is the first treaty through which states have been
guaranteed the right to be informed and to participate in trade matters
affecting the states.'53 In response to states' concerns about the
potential legal threats raised by NAFTA,5 4 the NAFTA implement-
147. Id. at 9.
148. Id. at 9-10.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 10.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Schaefer, supra note 37, at 182.
154. See Morales, supra note 80, at 14-15 (describing the background against which the
NAFTA federal-state consultation process was developed: Throughout the NAFTA ratification
process, states were cognizant of a particular GATT dispute settlement case which affected state
laws and in which the states did not receive notice nor the opportunity to participate. Thus, the
states were seeking a more involved role in future international trade disputes. As a result, the
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ing legislation contains many specific provisions that guarantee states
the ability to protect their laws: the right to be notified if a state law
is challenged; the right to participate in the defense of state laws; and,
the right to be notified of proceedings other than challenges that have
the potential to affect states.1 5' The federal-state consultation
provision contained within the Implementation Act, as well as
provisions set out within the Statement of Administrative Action
reflects the federal government's commitment to increasing communi-
cation with the States about trade-related matters that affect their
interests.156
The NAFTA consultative framework is codified under section
102(b)(1)(B) of the bill as the Federal-State Consultation Process. This
consultative framework for communications with states in international
trade matters reinforces the administration's goals and objectives
contained within the Statement of Administrative Action and estab-
lishes procedures for the following:
1) grandfathering or revising state laws and regulations consistent
with NAFTA to avoid conflicts with the agreement;
2) informing states on matters under the agreement affecting states;
3) providing opportunities for states to advise and inform the U.S.
trade representative on agreement issues affecting states;
4) responding to the information and advice received from the states
in developing the United States' positions on agreement issues
affecting states; and,
5) involving states to the greatest extent practicable in developing
the United States' positions regarding agreement issues affecting states.'157
USTR worked with the states in developing a federal-state communication system regarding
international trade matters.).
155. Implementation Act, supra note 11, § 102(b)(1)(2) and (c); see also Statement of
Administrative Action, supra note 63, at 11 (reinforcing state involvement by stating that
where a state measure is at issue, USTR will invite state representatives to attend panel
hearings and, where appropriate, to make presentations to the panel on the state measure
concerned .... Should a panel determine that a state measure is inconsistent with the
NAFTA, USTR will work cooperatively with the state concerned to fashion a mutually
agreeable settlement of the dispute in conformity with U.S. obligations under the
Agreement.).
156. Implementation Act, supra note 11, § 102(b)(1).
157. Id. at § 102(b)(1)(B).
The Trade Representative shall establish within the Office of the United States Trade
Representative a Federal-State consultation process for addressing issues relating to the
Agreement that directly relate to, or will potentially have a direct impact on, the States.
The Federal-State consultation process shall include procedures under which - (i) the
Trade Representative will assist the States in identifying those State laws that may not
conform with the Agreement but may be maintained under the Agreement by reason
of being in effect before the Agreement entered into force;
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The Federal-State Consultation Process affirmatively establishes the
USTR's obligation to confer with states regarding NAFTA issues that
"directly relate to or that may have a direct effect on [States]."' 8
Thus, in conformity with the established NAFTA consultative
framework, the federal government is committed to carrying out U.S.
obligations under NAFTA, as they apply to the States, through the
greatest possible degree of federal-state consultation and cooperation.
The impact of NAFTA upon state law is remarkable and will
only become more pronounced as trade among the United States,
Canada, and Mexico increases." 9 Each state's concern for protecting
its economies and citizens need not be compromised by the goal of free
trade. Congress and the state legislatures will each play an important
role in protecting state laws and sovereignty under NAFTA. 6 ° The
expanded federal-state cooperation and communication procedures
established by the NAFTA Statement of Administrative Action and
Implementation Act and implementing legislation are the tools by
which the U.S. government can realize the full economic and cultural
benefits of free trade while preserving states' autonomy.
IV. SAFEGUARDS FOR STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Do the States have the ability to safeguard against limitations
placed upon their regulatory authority if the NAFTA consultative
framework fails and the federal government does not uphold its
obligations to states? In the hypothetical scenario, for example, if the
(ii) the States will be informed on a continuing basis of matters under the Agreement
that directly relate to, or will potentially have a direct impact on, the States;
(iii) the States will be provided opportunity to submit, on a continuing basis, to the
Trade Representative information and advice with respect to matters referred to in
clause (ii);
(iv) the Trade Representative will take into account the information and advice received
from the States under clause (iii) when formulating United States positions regarding
matters referred to in clause (ii); and,
(v) the States will be involved (including involvement through the inclusion of
appropriate representatives of the States) to the greatest extent practicable at each stage
of the development of United States positions regarding matters referred to in clause (ii)
that will be addressed by committees, subcommittees, or working groups established
under the Agreement or through dispute settlement processes provided for under the
Agreement.
Id.
158. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 63, at 9.
159. Chile will soon become a member of NAFTA. See U.S. Dep't. of State Dispatch,
"Post-Summit Priorities in the Hemisphere," Vol. 6 (1995).
160. See generally Implementation Act, supra note 11; see also Statement of Administrative
Action, supra note 63.
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U.S. government agrees with Mexico that the American states' actions
are incompatible with NAFTA's obligations, under NAFTA's federal-
state consultation process, the U.S. government is committed to the
task of working with the affected states to help them comply with
NAFTA. The language of NAFTA, however, does not create a
constitutional requirement that the federal government actually consult
with the states. Nor do the states have any recourse, other than the
political process, to ensure that the federal government meets its
consultation obligation. Thus, the affected states in the hypothetical
scenario would find themselves in a precarious position if the U.S.
government sided with Mexico and did not honor its obligation under
the NAFTA consultative framework. Due to the lack of existing
constitutional safeguards against infringement on state sovereignty,
each state should take the responsibility to utilize the federal-state
consultation process to ensure that its interests are protected.
Although the NAFTA federal-state consultation process is not
without flaws, it does provide a framework from which the States and
the federal government can build an appropriate safeguard for state
sovereignty that will restore the balance of American federalism. The
NAFTA federal-state consultation process and the U.S. government's
commitment to consult with states on trade related issues promise to
eliminate much of the guesswork from federal-state communications
concerning international trade policy. For example, the USTR is
obligated to communicate each state's responsibilities in a timely
manner so that each state has an opportunity to comply and to notify
others within the state of these obligations. 161 The NAFTA consul-
tative framework also provides each state with definite procedures, such
as the opportunity to submit information regarding trade related
matters that impact the states to the USTR 62 and other points of
contact, such as the NAFTA coordinator, 163 to ensure that states
have the chance to preserve their regulatory authority.
Communication between the federal government and each state
can be improved upon to further safeguard against the failure of the
consultation process and limitations on state regulatory authority.
There are several ways in which communication between the two
powers can be enhanced, thereby increasing the likelihood of success
for the consultation process. First, the federal government should
actively foster state government input. Partnerships between federal
161. Morales, supra note 80, at 18.
162. Implementation Act, supra note 11, § 102(b)(1)(B)(iii).
163. See Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 63.
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and state regulatory authorities will provide an important avenue for
state participation in fulfilling trade agreement obligations. 164
Second, the federal government should develop other mechanisms for
communicating with state governments to achieve common goals under
trade agreements.16 Finally, the federal government should support
and encourage bilateral and trilateral communications between
subnational governments."' For example, in the hypothetical,
Washington State and Mexico should communicate regarding the
appropriate fumigation requirements for cherries. This type of
communication will benefit state governments from both sides.
Not only will more effective utilization of the NAFTA consulta-
tive process benefit both state and federal governments, but if states
also become more involved in the established administrative process,
the federal government will be able to make more informed policy
decisions by listening to and considering state input. Federal-state
relations in implementing NAFTA are likely to be cooperative in
nature.'67 Therefore, if the federal government and the states meet
their obligations under the NAFTA federal-state consultation process,
NAFTA will preserve state sovereignty while enhancing international
trade.
164. See Enrique Manzanilla, The Future for State/Federal Partnerships in the
Environment, Address Before the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs Conference on The
Impacts of Trade Agreements on State/Provincial Laws (Nov. 10, 1995) (transcript available in
Univ. of Texas at Austin Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs Library).
165. Id.; see also Robert Stumberg, Balancing Democracy & Trade: The Impact of GATT
& NAFTA on State Law, Address Before the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs
Conference on The Impacts of Trade Agreements on State/Provincial Laws, (Nov. 10, 1995)
(transcript available in Univ. of Texas at Austin Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs
Library). Stumberg asserts that strategies for balancing democracy and trade should include the
following:
(1) Internal Policymaking process: identify policy alternatives, elicit a record of
testimony and comments on the alternatives, write a report that establishes the purpose
and necessity for the approach chosen;
(2) Upward Harmonization Process: shared environment compacts, shared model
policies with an interactive drafting process, cooperative code revision process for after-
the-fact harmonization;
(3) Drafting: articulate a recognized policy purpose, coordinate standards with those of
other states or federal law, meet requirements for general trade agreement exceptions,
stay within specific US reservations, avoid explicit trade restraints; and
(4) Government relations: create a NAFTA review commission with state representa-
tion and meaningful standards of review, share information across separations of power
(governor, agencies, legislature, attorney general), create an Internet dissemination
system to overcome the bottlenecks between USTR, governors' trade representatives,
and the rest of state government.
Id.
166. See Manzanilla, supra note 164.
167. Interview with Clayton Parker, supra note 41.
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite concerns that NAFTA will impermissibly violate state
sovereignty, it is possible to promote free trade and to preserve state
sovereignty under NAFTA. However, to maintain an appropriate
balance between the federal government's NAFTA obligations and the
sovereignty of the fifty states, the existing relationship between federal
and state governments' conflicting interests must be adjusted. One
way to adjust the balance is through consultation and cooperation
between the federal and state governments.
While the federal government has no legal duty to consult with
the states, the creation of the NAFTA federal-state consultation
process represents an awareness by the federal government of the
importance of consulting with states about U.S. trade policy, and a
willingness to do so. In order for the consultation process to work
successfully, each state must take responsibility for communicating
with the federal government about trade issues that affect its interests.
If both federal and state leaders work together and utilize the NAFTA
federal-state consultation process, the American federalist system will
stand ready to face the challenges of globalization.
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